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                    I. Introduction 
  The problem concerning illegal acts of certain juridical entities is a familiar 
subject in municipal aw and has already been extensively studied both under 
company law and administrative law of some countries. It has presented itself, 
in particular, as a problem of ultra vires acts of a company or that of exces de 
pouvoir of an administrative organ of a State. Even under international law, 
similar problems have been dealt with in the law of state responsibility. With 
the recent evolution of international organizations, however, a new problem 
has come to the fore which is prima facie similar to, but in some important res-
pects different from, those existing problems. We may, therefore, discuss the 
problem of illegal acts of international organizations as a distinct subject of 
study. 
  As will be anticipated, the problem we are now facing involves many aspects 
each of which itself deserves extended iscussion. The legal effect of illegal 
acts of international organizations, inter alia, is no doubt one of the problems 
of particular importance in the practical operations of international organiza-
tions. Space permits, however, the examination of only a few aspects of the 
whole matter. Thus, the scope of this paper is limited to an exposition of the 
following questions : first, what acts of international organizations can be dis-
     * Assistant Professor fInternational L w, Osaka University.
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cerned as illegal acts, or, the question concerning, so to speak, possible types 
of illegal acts; and, second, how the illegality of such acts could be deternined 
or what organ could review such acts, or, the question concerning, so to speak, 
control of illegal acts. Some consideration on these questions appears to be 
prerequisite to any further study on the whole problem on the illegal acts of 
international organizations. 
  In pursuing the present study, two kinds of materials will be availed of which 
are in some respects distinct from each other. One is legal instruments, that is 
to say, the constitutional documents of certain international organizations; 
e. g., the Treaties constituting three European Communities, the abortive Hava-
na Charter establishing the International Trade Organization, the Statutes of 
the administrative tribunals of the United Nations or the International Labor 
Organization, etc. The other is the materials which suggest how to deal with 
the illegal acts of international organizations whose basic instruments are silent 
as to the matters in question; e.g., two advisory opinions of the International 
Court of Justice concerning respectively the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization and Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations.' 
  Among thematerials mentioned above, only two will be here examined, 
one from each class : first, the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, and, second, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
Certain Expenses Case. The reason for taking up the ECSC Treaty is that it 
has elaborate and in that sense unprecedented provisions with respect - o the 
illegal acts of its institutions and the effective means of controling them together 
with the fact that fairly abundant cases have been decided by the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities. In the majority of other international 
organizations, on the other hand, the more important question will be how to 
dispose of allegedly illegal acts in the absence of express provisions. This is 
precisely that which has vexed the United Nations in some way or the other. 
This is the reason for taking up as a second material the Advisory Opinion of 
the Court on Certain Expenses of the United Nations. 
  In analyzing these materials, the first question which I have posed, that is, 
what kinds of acts can be discerned as illegal acts of international organizations, 
      1) E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organiza-
tions", Cambridge Essays in International Law-Essays in honour of Lord McNair, 1965, 
London, p. 94. In fact his article inspired the present writer to set out he study on the sub-
ject with which this paper attempts to deal.
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will be examined in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, and 
the second question, that is, another aspect of controling them, will be discussed 
in the case of the United Nations. 
  Before going further, however, what has to be clarified as a preliminary ques-
tion is, in my view, the meaning of illegal acts of international organizations. 
Thus, in the following section, abrief mention of this will be made for the bene-
fit of later discussion. 
    II. The meaning of Illegal Acts of International Organizations 
  An international entity which is here designated as an international organi-
zation will be defined as an association of two or more States, whose individual 
wills are organized and incorporated by its constitution i to one common will 
distinct from those of its members,2 ) which is again distributed into and operat-
ed by various organs prescribed by the constitution." It thus possesses a corpo-
rate personality in the strict sense of the term. What is to be distinguished from 
this is a group of States whose will is nothing but the aggregate of the individual 
wills of participating States. An international organization so defined oes not 
necessarily possess international legal personality, that is, the capacity of being 
the subject of international law. This is due to the fact that there is no positive 
international law which uniformly attributes legal personality to every inter-
national organization .4) In other words, on the international scene, corporate 
personality and legal personality may not always coincide. 
  With regard to an international organization, its international legal person-
ality will come into question only in the case where the organization concerned 
has the capacity to act on its external plane, for its external acts can only be per-
formed in accordance with the law outside the organization, that is, the rules of 
general or particular international law, as the principles of its conduct.5 ) But 
international organizations which have been defined include not only the organi-
      2) Paul Reuter, International I stitutions, 1958, New York, pp. 214-215,231.See 
also Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951, p.329. 
      3) Niemon Obuchi, "The Theory on the SubjectsofInternational L w", Kokusai-
ho Gaiko Zasshi (The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), Vol. 62, No. 1. 
      4) D. W. Bowett, The Law of International I stitutions, 1963, p.296. 
      5) Thus, Bowett maintains, "To the extent that he activitiesare internal ctivities, 
relating tothe functions ofthe organs, there will generally beadequately covered by the con-
stitutional texts of the organization. It is when the activities become external in the sense of
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zations with the capacity of external action but also those whose activities are 
confined exclusively on the internal plane of the organization, that is, the rela-
tions between the organization and its members. To possess international 
personality is not, therefore, sine qua non for an international body to be an 
international organization. 
  From what has been observed will now be clear the meaning of illegal acts, 
or, what the law is, when it is alleged that a certain act of an organization con-
travenes the law. It does not indicate public international law in general which 
exists outside the orbit of any international organization. Certain international 
organizations could, of course, act in contravention of the rules of such exter-
nal international law, but this will be possible only in the case where the organi-
zations concerned possess the capacity to act under such external rules. Care-
ful observation of the existing international organizations will reveal the fact 
that the capacity of external action or international legal personality is in reality 
attributed to the very limited number of organizations .6 ) Furthermore, the 
nature of acts against external rules is, in my view, identical in its juridical sig-
nificance with acts of a State in violation of the rules of international law. It 
thus appears doubtful whether such acts need any special treatment under the 
independent title of illegal acts of international organizations. 
  Consequently, laws which are implied in the words of illegal acts merely sig-
nify the constitutional l w and other ules derived thereof, or, what are called in 
short, internal laws, of an organization. Each organ of an international organ-
ization performs its functions imposed by the constitution by exercising the 
powers conferred upon it. Principles of its conduct are not the rules of inter-
national aw but the internal laws of the organization.7> It is true that the con-
affecting third parties ....that the constitutional texts may afford no guidance to the pro-
blems raised." Ibid., p. 296. 
      6) As for the general discussion f legal personality of international organizations, 
see D. P. O'Connell, International Law, Vol. I, 1965, pp. 89-92. See also Clive Parry, "The 
Treaty Making Power of the United Nations", British Yearbook f International Law, 1949 
(Vol. xxvi), pp. 91-92; Bowett, op. cit., p. 275; Yoshio Kawashima, "International Legal 
Personality of International Organizations", Handai Hogaku (Osaka University Law Review), 
No. 58, 1966, and, "The Legal Nature of the United Nations", Handai Hogaku, No. 59-60. 
      7) E. Lauterpacht divides the `unlawful acts' of international organizations i to 
two categories. In one class fall "those acts which even though committed byinternational 
organizations are nevertheless of a kind which could also be committed by states". The other 
class of act is "that which can arise only in the context ofinternational organization-the ype 
 of illegal act which, as an element i  its illegality, involves a reference to the special nature of 
international organizations as artificial legal persons deriving all their powers from a con-
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stitution of an organization is enacted by the agreement of participating States 
often under the title of a treaty. But the designation only indicates a formal 
phase of the agreement and the substance is different from usual agreements of 
contractual nature which only create or clarify rights and obligations of the par-
ties under international law. On the contrary, an agreement constituting an 
international organization does actually create an entity which is independent 
of its members and leads its own life. This is an organized society per se and 
its internal activities are regulated by the sum of the norms agreed upon both at 
the time of its establishment and in the process of its subsequent development. 
Viewed in its entirety, these norms constitute a legal order, or, as some writer 
calls, the ordre juridique interne of the organization.s 1 Within such an internal 
order the great part of the activities of various organs appears to be very similar 
to, although not identical with, administrative acts of a certain organ of a State. 
  The acts of the members of the organization committed in violation of the 
internal law are considered as the conduct contrary to the common interest of 
the organization, against which the law itself usually prescribes certain measures 
of sanction as a counteraction. But more usually this is not the case with respect 
to the acts of the organs contrary to the internal law. It is perhaps due to the 
consideration that if the effects of the acts of the organs are always likely to be 
vitiated on account of their illegality the purposes of the organization cannot 
fully be achieved. However, in an organization with much limited purposes 
and comparatively strong powers to attain the purposes the possibility will in-
crease that the individual interests of its members are encroached upon by the 
arbitrary acts of its organs. It is natural, therefore, that its members, in anticipat-
ing such a situation, try to ensure that every act of the organs be performed 
strictly in conformity with the laws of the organization or that powers of the 
organs be exercised within the prescribed scope of the original engagement they 
entered into. This is what the six members of the European Communities did 
in drawing up the respective governing instruments. Control of illegal acts of 
international organizations is for the first time embodied in their constitutions 
together with the definite types of illegal acts. 
ventional or statutory souce and bound to act only within the limits and in accordance with 
the terms of the grant made to them." Op. cit., p. 89. 
      8) Philippe Cahier, "Le Droit interne des Organisations Internationales", Revue 
General de Droit International Public, 1963, No. 3, pp. 571-578; See also Lazar Focsaneanu, 
"Le Droit interne de L'Organisation des Nations Unies", Annuaire Francais de Droit Inter-
national, 1957, pp. 315 ff.
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  III. Types of Illegal Acts - In the Case of the European Coal and 
      Steel Community 
  In attempting to recognize what acts of international organizations will fall 
into the category of illegal acts, we now turn to the practice of the European 
Coal and Steel Community for a guidpost. The reason for limiting our inquiry 
to that Community is that, in addition to the fact that, as I have mentioned, the 
greatest part of the precedents of the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities are occupied by the cases brought against he ECSC, the types of illegal 
acts enumerated in the three Community Treaties are exactly identical9 >and 
one can therefore be justified in taking up the ECSC as a model organization. 
  Before examining the judgements of the Court in which the illegality of indi-
vidual acts will be illuminated, afew words will be necessary about the position 
of the Court in the European Communities. The Court is given the function 
"to ensure the rule of law in the interpretation and application of the present 
Treaty and of its implimenting regulations" 10), and after the establishment of 
the EEC and Euratom the Court has become the common institution but its 
function remains the same.") Hence, the determination of illegal acts by the 
Court is authoritative and with the accumulation of the relevant judgements 
the scope of illegitimate acts in the Communities has gradually been shaped. 
In this respect the Court has contributed to the evolution of the law of interna-
tional institutions. 
  Thetypes of acts which may be vitiated on account of their illegality are 
enumerated in Article 33 of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and 
Steel Community in the following terms: 
       The Court shall have jurisdictionver appeals by a member State or by the Council 
    for the annulment of decisions and recommendations of the High Authority on the 
    ground of lack of legal competence, substantial procedural violations, violation ofthe 
    Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, r abuse of power. However,the 
    Court may not review the conclusions of the High Authority, drawn from economicfacts 
    and circumstances, which formed the basis of such decisions or recommendations, except 
    where the High Authority isalleged tohave abused its powers or to have clearly mis-
      9) Relevant articles of these Treaties are: Art. 33 of the ECSC Treaty, Art. 173 
of the EEC Treaty and Art. 147 of the Euratom Treaty. 
     10) Art. 31 of the ECSC Treaty. 
      11) Art. 4 of the Convention relating tocertain I stitutions common tothe European 
Communities.
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   interpreted heprovisions of the Treatyorof a rule of law relating toits application. 
       The enterprises, or the associations referred toin Article 48, shall havethe right of 
   appeal on the same grounds against individual decisions and recommendations which 
   they deem to involve an abuse of power affecting them. 
       The appeals provided for in the first wo paragraphs of the present article must be 
   taken within one month from the date of the notification r the publication, asthe case 
   may be, of the decision orrecommendation. 
The relevant part to our present discussion is only the first sentence of the 
first paragraph, although rather lengthy reproduction of the whole article is 
here made because of its important position in the entire system of the Treaty. 
  Four grounds of appeal contained in this provision, namely, lack of legal 
competence, substantial procedural violation, violation of the Treaty or any 
rule of law relating to its application, and abuse of power, correspond to the 
well-known cas d'ouverture in the administrative tribunals of some of the Euro-
pean countries, particularly in the Conseil d'Etat of France.121 And, as the 
Court is often referred to as the Conseil d'Etat of the European Communities, 
they are incorporated almost en bloc in the laws of the Communities. The fol-
lowing is the elucidation of each type of illegal acts appeared in the cases 
before the Court.13 
(1) Lack of Legal Competence 
  According to theFrench text of the Treaty the equivalent is incompetence. 
Translated into English terms, the nearest is said to be substantive ultra vires.14 ) 
Thus, in two cases in 1960,15) the Court held that the ECSC Treaty did not grant 
any power either expressis verbis, or by implication, to enforce certain provisions 
of the Treaty by means of decisions.16) Article 70, paragraph 3 of the ECSC 
Treaty provides that "the rate scales, prices, and tariff provisions of all sorts 
     12) L. Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, French Administrative Law, 1967, pp. 118-126. 
     13) D. G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Communities,1965, Vols. 
I & II., to which I am much indebted for the following description concerning the types of 
illegal acts appeared in the actual cases before the Court. 
      14) Brown and Garner, op. cit., p. 120. 
     15) Netherlands Government v. TheHigh Authority (Case 25-59) and Italian Govern-
ment v. The High Authority (Case 20-59). 
     16) Under the provision ofArticle 14 of the ECSC Treaty, decisions are binding in 
all their details, while recommendations are binding with respect tothe objectives which they 
specify but must leave to those to whom they are directed the choice of appropriate m ans 
for attaining these objectives. As regards the emphasis onthe distinction between decisions 
and recommendations which as been put by the Court, see Valentine, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 118, 
note 34.
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applied to the transport of coal and steel within each member State and among 
the member States hall be published or brought o the knowledge of the High 
Authority." 
  Based on this provision, the High Authority passed a series of decisions 
specifying certain matters which were to be brought o its knowledge. Both the 
Netherlands and the Italian Governments challenged the validity of these deci-
sions on the ground that the High Authority has no power under this provision 
to take a decision. 
  The Court accepted this contention and in its judgement i declared: 
       "Although it is true that, by virtue of a general principle, applied moreover byAr-
   ticle 70 in regard to transport, control of discriminations a dpunitive action with regard 
   to them devolves upon the High Authority, et one cannot, however, deducefrom this 
   principle that he High Authority has been granted a power of decision relatingto an 
   anticipatory control by prescribing the manner ofthe publication f price lists or prices. 
    Its competence, ad hoc, is by way of an exception a d is subordinated o arenunciation 
    by Member States, which in this instance the Treaty does not contain, either expressly 
   or by implication. 
       Onemust, therefore, deny to the High Authority any power to enforce the provi-
    sions of Article 70, paragraph 3, by means ofDecisions.'"17) 
As the Court correctly stated, in case that there cannot be descerned any grant 
of power to a certain organ in a certain provision of the basic law of an inter-
national organization on the basis of which an action was taken, it must be consi-
dered that the organ has no competence to act at least under the provision con-
cerned and consequently the action taken is nought in the province of law. 
This is the fundamental principle of any corporate person and the ECSC is no 
exception. Any act in violation of the principle, therefore, must be regarded 
as an illegal act in the wider sense of the term. 
(2) Substantial Procedural Violation 
  The distinction between this head of illegality and the head of violation of 
the Treaty immediately following is in reality not always easy to be made. In 
fact, the Court found in a case a certain act of the High Authority illegal on the 
ground that it constituted "violation of the Treaty or violation of a substantial 
procedural requirement." 18) However, there is, at least in theory, a distinction 
     17) Netherlands Government v. The High Authority (Case 25-59), citedinValentine, 
Vol. I, op. cit., p. 125. 
     18) ItalianGovernment v. The High Authority (Case 2-54), cited in Valentine, Vol.1, 
op. cit., p. 127.
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between these two heads of appeal. It is thus suggested that it is possible to 
conceive of a decision which in its wording and effect is in full compliance with 
the Treaty, yet during the stages preceding its enactment procedural require-
ments have not been observed. The decision, on its wording alone, could not 
therefore be challenged; it is only the manner of its enactment that in such a 
case is open to attack.19  The Court accepted such a distinction in some of the 
cases before it. 
  For instance, Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty provides concerning prices that 
unfair competitive practices and discriminatory practices are prohibited and that 
the High Authority may define the practices covered by such prohibition after 
consultation with the Consultative Committee and the Council. Thus, the 
Court declared in the very first case that a failure of the High Authority to con-
sult the Council would have been a violation of the Treaty, but that because that 
violation would have occurred in one of the preliminary stages prior to the final 
enactment of the decision concerned that decision itself would not have been 
void by reason of a violation of the Treaty but by reason of a violation of a sub-
stantial procedural requirement.20) In this case, the plaintiff was the French 
Government, that is, a Member State, but if the plaintiff was the Council the de-
cision would have been appealed on the ground of a violation of the Treaty. 
  Another example which amounts, in the opinion of the Court, to a substan-
tial procedural violation is a failure of the High Authority to support its deci-
sions with reasons '21) for it is provided in Article 15 that the decisions, recom-
mendations and opinions of the High Authority shall state the reasons therefor. 
Furthermore, the acts which would fall within this category of illegality would 
be such acts as impose apecuniary sanction or fix a daily penalty payment with-
out giving the interested enterprise an opportunity to present i s views (Art. 36), 
or a failure to obtain the required concurrence of the Council (Art. 52 (b)). 
(3) Violation of the Treaty or any Rule of Law concerning its Application 
     19) Ibid., p. 127. 
     20) Ibid., pp.127-128. French Government v. The High Authority (Case 1-54). 
     21) Netherlands Government v. The High Authority (Case 6-54); Meroni & Co., 
S.P.A. v. The High Authority (Case 9-56); Nold KG v. The High Authority (Case 18-57); 
Netherlands Government v. The High Authority (Case 6-54); Industrie Siderurgiche Associate 
v. The High Authority (Case 4-54); "Geitling" and others v.The High Authority (Case 2-56); 
Koninklijke N derlandsche Hoogovens Staalfabrieken N. V.v. The High Authority (Case 14-61); 
German Government v. The High Authority (Case 19-58), cited in Valentine, Vol. I, op. cit., 
pp. 129-131.
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  An instance of this head of illegality will be found in a case in which a decision 
was annulled on the ground of its violation of a certain provision of the Treaty.22 ) 
The decision of the High Authority in question was to the effect that the 
iron producers were authorized to sell their products 2.5 per cent higher or 
lower than the price determined in the price lists which were to be published. 
But, according to Article 60, paragraph 2, the publication of the price lists are 
obligatory and moreover the prices must not be higher or lower than the price 
indicated by the price lists. The Court further construed the provision as indi-
cating that the price contained in the price lists must be exact at the time of the 
sale concerned and declared that the decision of the High Authority constituted 
a violation of the Treaty. 
  It is thus understood that this head of violation of the Treaty points to the 
acts committed explicitly in contravention of the Treaty provisions. However, 
because of the general and flexible nature of the Treaty which purports to "keep 
pace with the ever changing and lively development of economic affairs"23 ), there 
exists ome margin of discretion on the part of the High Authority. In deter-
mining the illegality of a particular act, therefore, the Court has in practice met 
with the difficulty of delimiting this head of illegality from lack of competence or
abuse of power.24) Thus, with regard to one and the same decision of the High 
Authority, the Court found it a violation of the Treaty in the above-mentioned 
case and declared it as abuse of power in two other cases.25 ) 
  With respect to violation of a rule of law, the Court has accepted a very broad 
scope of its application.26) Thus, in one case, the decision of the High Authori-
ty was appealed which had demanded the payment back from certain steel enter-
prises of subsidy payments which had been wrongly paid. The Court recogniz-
ed the existence of a general proposition of law to the effect hat the payment 
back of money could only be demanded when there existed some element of 
unjustified enrichment on the part of the party being required to pay. Then, 
the Court found :
       "In effect, the subsidy was aimed at reducing the difference in price between im-
     22) Italian Government v. The High Authority (Case 2-54), cited in Valentine,Vol. I,
op. cit., p. 135. 
     23) Gerhard Bebr, Judicial Control f the European Communities, 1962, p.92. 
     24) Valentine, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 135. 
     25) Associazione I dustrie Siderurgiche Italiane (ASSIDER) v. The High Authority 
(Case 3-54), Valentine, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 135-136. 
     26) Valentine, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 136,138.
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    ported scrap which is more xpensive,andscrap coming from within the Common Mar-
   ket. 
       This additional cost, according to the very principles upon which the subsidy is 
    based, ought to be borne, not by the plaintiffs, by reason ofthe supplies of importedscrap 
    received bythem, but by all of the consumers of crap... . 
       The payment of the subsidy did not, therefore, constitute anenrichment forthe 
   plaintiffs by reason ofa payment which benefited them directly, but was the result of an 
   operation which aligned the price of the scrap delivered, to the price on the domestic 
     market.. . 
       The conditions for an unjustified nrichment requiring repayment do not exist in 
   this case. 
       Under thesecircumstances, the Decisions [demanding such repayment], by violating 
   the rules of law concerning the application f the Treaty, must be annulled."s7) 
In this case, therefore, the Court has interpreted the rule of law as a general prin-
ciple of law which prescribes the repayment based on an unjustified enrichment.S8 
This category of rules of law also includes the rule of correct interpretation 
which the High Authority gives to the terms of its own decisions,29) or general 
acts which the High Authority may issue in accordance with the statutory 
powers expressly provided for by the Treaty.80' 
(4) Abuse of Power 
  Although translated invarious ways into English, the original terms of detour-
nement de pouvoir in the French text is used in the works of some English writers. 
This reveals the fact that, although the concept of this head of illegality has rather 
uniform application in the administrative laws of most of the Member States of 
the European Communities, it appears omewhat different from anything known 
in Anglo-American law because it no way depends on any principle of ultra 
vires.81 > It is no doubt interesting and useful for a comparative study of admin-
istrative laws of various countries to scrutinize the concept of detournement 
de pouvoir where it is one of the grounds for review or to see if similar recourse 
     27) Mannesmann AG and others v.The High Authority (Joint Cases 4 to 13-59), ibid., 
pp. 136-137. 
     28) However, Bebr says, "It seems doubtful, atleast for the moment, that he Court 
would go so far as to consider violations of general principles of law not incorporated in the 
Treaty as adequate grounds ofillegality". Op. cit., p. 91. 
     29) For example, Societe Nouvelle d s Usines dePontlieue-Acieries du Temple (S.N. 
U.P.A.T.) v. The High Authority (Cases 32-58 and 33-58), Valentine, op. cit., pp. 137-138. 
     30) Bebr, op. cit., p. 90. 
      31) Brown and Garner, op. cit., p. 124.
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can be found where there is no such ground as this. But the European Commu-
nities could form their own concept of detournement de pouvoir and this is exact-
ly the function of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Further-
more, whereas in municipal law it is just one of the grounds of illegality for annul-
ment, it assumes a quite unique position in the European Communities.32' For, 
in Article 33, paragraph 2 of the ECSC Treaty which I have quoted, the enter-
prises or other bodies could appeal only against such general decisions and rec-
ommendations of the High Authority that they deem to involve a detournement 
de pouvoir affecting them. What we concern here is not, however, to examine 
such a role of this concept in the European Treaties, but rather to present a 
brief account of the attitude of the Court as to what acts of the High Authority 
fall within this head of illegality. 
  First of all, as regards the definition of detournement de pouvoir, the defini-
tion will be cited which was given by the High Authority as its defense in an 
earlier case. It stated :
       "There is a detournement de pouvoir when an administrative act is objectively in ac-
   cordance with the rule of law but subjectively vitiatedby reason of the aim being pursued 
    by the administrative authority.' 133) 
The Court, in another occasion, made a similar statement in such general 
terms as: 
        "The powers. . . .granted to the High Authority. . .become divorced (detourne) 
   from their legal objectives if it appears that the High Authority in dealing with circum-
    stances with which it is faced has used them with the sole purpose, or at any rate with the 
    dominant purpose, of avoiding aprocedure specially provided by the Treaty [i.e., for an 
    improper purpose]."34) 
  No act of the High Authority has yet been annulled on the ground of detour-
nement de pouvoir, but the Court has in several occasions expressed its views on 
what acts would constitute this head of illegality. A few examples will here be 
cited. 
  Thus, according to Article 59, paragraph 1, on the one hand, if the High Au-
thority finds that the Community is faced with the serious shortage of coal or 
      32) Bebr, op. cit., p. 99. 
     33) Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v.The High Authority (Case 8-55), cited in 
Valentine, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 139. 
     34) Groupement desHauts Fourneaux etAcieries Belges v. The High Authority (Case 
8-57), ibid., p. 139.
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steel and that a certain measures do not enable it to cope with the situation, it 
must bring the situation to the attention of the Council and must propose the 
necessary measures. But, by Article 53 (b), on the other hand, the High Autority 
may institute itself any financial mechanism common to several enterprises 
which are deemed necessary for the accomplishment of its mission. 
  In a case where these two provisions were at issue, the Court has stated: 
       "It must be recognised that a detournement d  pouvoir would have occurred if the 
   High Authority, finding itself aced with a situation which necessitated the application 
    of the procedure s t out in Article 59, had nevertheless, in order to avoid the guarantees 
   of Article 59, proceeded under Article 53 (b) and the financial rrangements which it 
     contains."35) 
  Again, according to Article 61 of the Treaty, the High Authority may fix in 
certain circumstances maximum prices for coal and steel, if it deems necessary 
to establish the lowest possible prices for such products. In a case where a 
decision of the High Authority based on the power granted by this Article was 
alleged to constitute a detournement de pouvoir, the Court declared: 
       "This ground [of appeal] requires one to judge whether, when fixing maximum 
    prices by virtue of Article 61 of the Treaty, the High Authority sought notsomuch the 
    objectives which it stated, particularly a lowering ofprices, but in reality that it sought 
    to act against agreements andconcentrations of enterprises. 
       It would thus have used the powers whichwere given to it by Article 61 for a pur-
    pose other than the one for which those powers were given."36 
  As has been observed, the determination of this head of illegality confronts 
a difficulty because it mainly concerns the subjective motives of the organ which 
performs the act in question. The fact must be noted here, however, that the 
Treaties of the European Communities, notwithstanding such a difficulty, have 
taken over this concept of detournement de pouvoir into their judicial system as 
one of the means to check the administrative acts of the institutions of the Com-
munities. It thus appears to offer a clear evidence that an international 
organization could, as the case may be, adopt such a head of illegality in its 
constitutional instrument.37 
      35) Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux deChasse v.The High Authority (Case 2-57), 
ibid., p. 140. 
      36) Netherlands Government v. The High Authority (Case 6-54), ibid., p. 141. 
     37) The possibility of general pplication f this concept tothe acts of international 
organizations in general is suggestedby J. E. S. Fawcett, "Detournement de Pouvoir by Inter-
national Organizations", The British Yearbook f International Law, 1957 (xxxiii), pp. 311-
316.
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  What we have seen in the law and cases of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity are the typical categories of illegal acts of international organizations. 
Our purpose has therefore been nothing but to indicate the types of illegal acts 
which could occur in any international organization. It would of course be 
possible ither to prescribe certain other categories of illegal acts in the basic 
documents of an organization or to provide for no such recourse. 
  It can be presumed, however, that those categories ofacts as indicated above 
could be alleged to be illegal and thus be likely to assume illegality in any interna-
tional organization regardless of the existence or absence of explicit enumeration 
of illegal acts in the constitution of the organization. In ordinary international 
organizations, it will suffice for the possible xistence of illegal acts to exhibit 
that the acts concerned fall into the broader concept of illegality which includes 
the four categories indicated in the European Treaties. In other words, an act 
is illegal when it is performed in any way in violation of the laws of the organi-
zation. An only exception to this at present is the case of the European Com-
munities where an appeal against illegal acts must be made on either one of the 
four grounds because of the explicit provisions of the categories of illegal acts 
and of the special significance attached to a detournement de pouvoir. 
     IV. Control of Illegal Acts - In the Case of the United Nations 
  As one of the cases of international organizations whose basic instruments 
are silent with regard to control of illegal acts committed by their organs, we now 
turn our attention to the United Nations. 
  A specific ase through whichwe are attempting to approach the problem 
will be found in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the case of Certain Expenses of the United Nations given on June 10, 1962. 
However, the examination here neither touches upon such points as the legality 
of the basic resolutions authorizing the establishments of respective United Na-
tions forces or that of financial measures nor appraise the conclusion of the 
Court's Opinion that the expenditures in question constitute "expenses of the 
Organization". Our purpose is rather to examine some of such aspects of the 
various opinions, including dissenting and individual ones, as appear useful in 
formulating the theory of illegal acts of international organizations in general 
and of the United Nations in particular. 
  Before going directly to thequestion as to how the existence of illegal acts 
is determined, it will be of some help to consider what kind of acts fall within the 
categories of illegal acts under the United Nations system.
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  The Opinion of the Court and those of the four judges, of whom one judge 
expressed individual opinion and three delivered issenting opinions, expressly 
took the position that an act must be intra vires the Organization in order to be 
legal. It is not clear, however, whether all the acts within the purposes of the 
Organization are intra vires the Organization. As to this point the Court de-
clares: 
       "...when the Organization takes action which warrants he assertion that it was 
   appropriate for the fulfilment ofone of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
    presumption s that such action is not ultra vires the Organization."38> 
It must be noted here that the Court says that action is presumed to be within 
the powers of the Organization if it is taken for the fulfilment of the purposes of 
the United Nations but does not say that such action is legal. The United Na-
tions possesses such powers as necessary for the achievement of its purposes, but 
they are distributed among the several organs with different functions. The 
legality of an act, in my opinion, can only adequately be claimed if it is done by 
a competent organ. However, the Court pronounces : 
       "If it is agreed that he action in question is within thescope of the functions ofthe 
   Organization butit is alleged that it has been initiated orcarried out in a mannernotin 
   conformity with division of functions among the several organs which the Charterpre-
    scribes, one moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. 
    If the action was taken by the wrong organ, itwas irregular s a matterof that internal 
    structure, but this would not necessarily mean that he expense incurred wasnot an 
    expense of the Organization. Both national nd international lawcontemplate casesin 
    which the body corporate orpolitic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires 
    act of an agent."39> 
  What is said here by the Court is no mistake in itself. As Judge Fitzmaurice 
pointed out, however, the matter we are now concerned isnot external but inter-
nal one. According to him, "what is really in question here is the relationship 
of the Member States inter se, and vis-d-vis the Organization as such," and "if 
an instrument such as the Charter of the United Nations 'attributes given func-
tions in an exclusive manner to one of its organs...... this can only be because, in
respect of the performance of the functions concerned, importance was attached 
to the precise constitution of the organ concerned."49 
     38) I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p.168. 
    39) Ibid. 
     40) Ibid., p. 200.
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  It appears that the Court is dealing with the matter as an external question, 
but it does not seem to deny altogether the existence of illegal acts in the internal 
relations of the Organization. Thus, the Court, when analyzing the functions 
of UNEF, refers to the resolution of the General Assembly which accepted the 
description of the functions of UNEF by the Secretary-General by saying: 
       "It could not therefore have been patent on the face of the resolution thatthe estab-
    lishment of UNEF was in effect `enforcement action' under Chapter VII which, in ac-
    cordance with the Charter, could be authorized only by the Security Council."41)
Such wording of the Court implies that the establishment of UNEF is within the 
powers of the General Assembly and therefore legal. If the Court, on the con-
trary, considered that it was patent on the face of the resolution that the action 
was taken ultra vires the Assembly, the Court would have declared that it was 
illegal. It can be presumed, therefore, that in this respect the Court is inclined to 
regard as illegal an act which is ultra vires an organ even in the internal relations 
of the United Nations. 
  The problem of illegal acts of the United Nations posed in the arguments of 
Ceratin Expenses Case has been dealt with in the light of the rather coarse concept 
of ultra vires. Hence, even if an act within the purposes of the United Nations 
can be presumed an intra vires act, it does not follow from this that an intra vires 
act is always legal. In order to avoid such simplification we must look for some 
basic means to ascertain the existence of illegal acts in the United Nations frame-
work. 
  In this respect Judge Bustamante maintains in his dissenting opinion: 
       "The United Nations is an association of States in which the rights andthe obliga-
   tions of the Members are contractually prescribed in its constituent charter. It is the
   Charter which governs the mutual relations of the associates and their relations withthe 
   Organization itself. Only because of their acceptance of the purposes of the Charterand 
   the guarantees therein laid down have the States Members partially limited the scope of 
   their sovereign powers (Article 2). It goes without saying, therefore, that the real reason 
   for the obedience of States Members to the authorities of the Organization is the confor-
   mity of the mandates of its competent organs with the text of the Charter. This principle 
   of the conditional link between the duty to accept institutional decisions and the confor-
   mity of those decisions with the Charter is enshrined in Article 25, which, although re-
   ferring explicitly to the Security Council, in my opinion lays down a fundamental basic 
   rule which is generally applicable to the whole system of the Charter. Article 2, para-
   graph 2, confirms this interpretation."42' 
     41) Ibid., p. 171. 
     42) Ibid., p. 304.
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Thus, whatever concrete forms they may take, illegal acts of the United Nations 
are not different from those of other international organizations in general in 
the fundamental character that they are performed in violation of the basic norms 
which were created by the common will of the participating States. 
  A question then arises, in the case that there is no competent organ to deter-
mine the illegality of an act such as in the case of the United Nations, whether 
an allegedly illegal act can nevertheless retain its legitimacy, or whether there is 
any conceivable means to determine an allegedly illegal act as illegal. With res-
pect to the determination of illegal acts by the United Nations, the Opinion of 
the Court states as follows :
       "In the legal systemsof States, there is often some procedure fordetermining the
    validity of even alegislative or governmental act,but no analogous procedure is tobe 
   found in the structure of the United Nations.... Proposals made during the drafting 
    of the Charter to place the ultimate authority ointerprete the Charter inthe Internation-
    al Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of render-
   ing is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must in the 
   first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction."43) 
  As Judge Fitzmaurice pointed out, it is in a sense amatter of course that each 
organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. For 
instance, when a certain provision of law leaves the performance of an act to the 
discretion of an organ, it is that organ, in the first place, to determine its own 
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the organ cannot perform its functions prescribed by 
the law. It goes without saying, of course, that in exercising its discretionary 
power to do some concrete acts the organ cannot exceed the limit provided 
for by the law in broad and abstract erms. However, what is in question here 
is not a primary determination by an organ of its own jurisdiction, but rather 
whether such a determination is final or whether there is any possibility that 
the act of the organ is reviewed and controled by whatever means. 
  While Judge Morelli takes the former position, Judge Bustamante akes the 
latter. It seems of value for further discussion on this subject o look through 
the contrary opinions of the two judges in some detail. 
  In approaching the problem of legality of acts, Judge Morelli chiefly concerns 
the aspect of their legal effect. He observes that in any legal system the problem 
of the validity of legal acts faces two different requirements : the requirement of
legality and the requirement of certainty. Particularly as regards administrative 
     43) Ibid., p. 168.
30 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 16 
acts those opposed requirements have been happily reconciled, because in general 
the invalidity of acts involves not the nullity but rather the voidability of the act. 
This aspect of invalidity of an administrative act as voidability in municipal law, 
he maintains, is closely linked with the system of the means of recourse open in 
such municipal aw against he illegitimacy of administrative acts. Then he 
turns to look at the problem on the international plane. He says :
       "In the case of acts of international organizations, and in particular the acts of the 
   United Nations, there is nothing comparable to the remedies existing in domesticlawin 
   connection with administrative acts. The consequence of this is that here is no possibi-
   lity of applying the concept ofvoidability othe acts of the United Nations.If an act 
   of an organ of the United Nations had to be considered as an invalid act, such invalidity 
    could constitute only the absolute nullity of the act. In other words, there areonly two 
    alternatives for the acts of the Organization: either the act is fully valid, or it is anab-
   solute nullity, because absolute nullity is the only form in which invalidity ofan actof 
    the Organization can occur."44> 
  Based on the observation quoted above, Judge Morelli carefully distinguishes 
certain acts of the Organization which could be regarded as invalid and hence 
constitute an absolute nullity. They include, in his view, a resolution which 
had not obtained the required majority, or a resolution vitiated by a manifest 
exces de pouvoir (such as, in particular, a resolution the object of which had 
nothing to do with the purposes of the Organization). On the other hand, how-
ever, there is other category of acts which involve violation of the rules governing 
competence. According to him, such acts are not considered null and void 
under the United Nations system. On the contrary, they are valid, because, 
while they are voidable in domestic law, there is no such acts as could be regard-
ed voidable in the United Nations for the reasons he has given. Then Judge Mo-
relli concludes : 
       "This means that he failure of the act o conform the rules concerning competence 
   has no influence onthe validity of the act, which amounts to saying that each organ of the 
    United Nations is the judge of its own competence."4s1 
  Judge Morelli's opinion which I have just outlined seems to be open to some 
criticism. First of all, whereas he denies the possibility of the existence ofvoid-
able acts in the United Nations, he admits a certain kind of acts which are null 
and void on the ground that there is no competent organ to determine the illegal-
     44) Ibid., p. 222. 
     45) Ibid., p.223-224.
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 ity of acts. In my opinion, however, it appears rather difficult to distinguish 
 between voidability and nullity of certain acts depending solely on whether there 
 exists a machinery of review, for the determination of nullity of an act is also 
 only possible in the case of the existence of a competent organ to pronounce 
 the legal effect of the act. But the problem of legal effect of illegal acts of inter-
 national organizations i so complex and important hat it deserves a separate 
 treatment. A second question, which we are now concerned, is whether there 
 is no organ to determine the illegality of acts in the United Nations system, in 
 other words, whether, even in spite of the absence of clear provisions in the Char-
 ter as to the organ with such a function, there is no such system in the United Na-
 tions as provides the means of recourse against he illegitimacy of acts. We 
 now move to the relevant opinion of another judge, Judge Bustamante.
   First of all, he admits that since the United Nations is a corporate person 
 there is a legal presumption that each of the organs of the Organization iscare-
 ful in its actions to comply with the prescription of the Charter. This does not 
 exclude, however, aright on the part of the Member States to challenge the reso-
 lution in which the error has been noted for the purpose of determining whether 
 or not it departed from the Charter. The claim that the resolutions of any organ 
 of the United Nations are not subject o review, he asserts, would amount o 
 declaring the pointlessness of the Chafter or its absolute subordination to the 
 judgement - always fallible - of the organs. Judge Bustamante continues: 
        "But the case of the United Nations is clearly a special one. Having regard to the 
     fact that it is the highest international institution as being an association of sovereign 
     States, its unfettered autonomy is subject o no higher tribunal capable of reviewing its 
     acts. It is the institution itself which has the power to rectify or to confirm them. That 
     is probably why no provision was made in the Charter for any supervisory organ to de-
     termine legality or conformity with the Charter. . . . But that in no way excludes the 
     Organization's function of dealing with complaints by its Members. And I think I find 
     evidence that that was the intention of the Charter in the text of its Article 96, which 
     makes provision for the advice of the International Court of Justice on legal questions. 
     An advisory opinion, taking the place of judicial proceedings, is a method of voluntary 
    recourse which, if only by way of elucidation, precedes the decision which the Organiza-
     tion is called upon to give with regard to legal objections raised by Member States."4s> 
 He then refers to the attitude of certain States which pointed out the illegality 
 of some resolutions or possible mistakes of interpretation of the Charter and 
 says: 
      46) Ibid., p. 304.
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       "This attitude on the part of certain States derives from an inherent right ofall
   members of associations which ave abody of rules to which the acts of the institution 
   have to conform. This principle ofconformity with the rules is, one mustnot forget, 
   the basis for a contractual obligation. The fact hat, faced with this numberof objec-
   tions, the General Assembly has asked for the legal opinion of the Court is-in my view 
   -the best proof that his organ of the United Nations intends to decide in accordance 
   with law the objections put forward by several ofits Members and-perhaps-to embark 
    upon a review or adaptation f the Charter to the new circumstances."47> 
  Judge Bustamante's opinion which I have just quoted is obviously opposed 
to that of Judge Morelli. The latter envisages only an organ of compulsory 
character as an organ of reviewing illegal acts of the United Nations. His opin-
ion is drawn from an analogy of administrative law or, in particular, of admin-
istrative litigation under municipal legal systems. Referring to the internal legal 
order of international organizations at the beginning of this paper I suggest 
that the nature of the acts of an international organization is similar to, or even 
identical with, that of administrative acts of a State and that therefore it will be 
possible to borrow to a certain extent he theories of administrative law in dealing 
with the problem of illegal acts of international organizations. My intention is 
not, however, to extend such an analogy to administrative litigation whose func-
tion is purely judicial. An analogy of municipal law is possible only to the ex-
tent that even in international organizations there can be similar types of illegal 
acts and some means of their control, but it does not extend to the nature of 
the control. In other words, in the legal system of a State, illegal acts are deter-
mined by courts, whose function is exclusively judicial, where the rules of law 
are clarified and disputes are ultimately solved. On the contrary, the control 
of illegal acts of international organizations i  not always judicial but in most 
cases political except in the case of the European Communities. It appears, 
therefore, to be based on a false analogy of municipal law to say that there is no 
means of controling illegal acts on account of the non-existence of such judicial 
control as can be found in domestic laws and that therefore illegal acts them-
selves do not exist at all in international organizations. 
  It is obvious that there is no such judicial control of illegal acts in the United 
Nations system. It is true that the International Court of Justice is a judicial 
organ in international society in the sense that it is vested the function and power 
to solve disputes between States. But it does not fully perform a judicial func-
tion in the internal administrative r lations, or the relations between the Member 
     47) Ibid., p. 305.
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States inter se, and vis-a-vis the United Nations as such. The evidence of the 
limited function of the International Court of Justice in the internal relations of 
the United Nations could be found in the fact that the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal was specially set up in order to solve disputes between the United 
Nations and its staffs. What the International Court of Justice could do in the 
internal relations of the United Nations is at most to give an advisory opinion on 
certain legal questions and moreover such an opinion is only of the nature of a 
recommendation. Since any organ of the United Nations cannot be parties in 
cases before the Court, the latter has no competence to solve disputes between 
the Member States and the organs of the United Nations or between the organs 
inter se.48 
  Thus, in view of the fact that the International Court of Justice is incompetent 
to perform a fully judicial function with regard to illegal acts within the United 
Nations, what is to be considered next is how to control such acts in the actual 
working of the Organization. It would not be realistic, although conceivable 
as a paper plan, to give to the International Court of Justice or to the United Na-
tions Administrative Tribunal the competence to review illegal acts. The only 
practical way conceivable at present is the one which the United Nations actually 
took in Certain Expenses Case. Although it did not here pass judgement on the 
illegality of a certain act, it appears that the method used here gives direction to 
the possible control of illegal acts of international organizations whose basic 
instruments are silent on the matter in question. 
  The question as to whether acertainact is in conformity with the rules of law 
is nothing but a purely legal question and the most appropriate organ to answer 
it is no doubt the International Court of Justice, whose opinions the organs of 
the United Nations may request.49 > The opinions thus given by the Court, 
without having any legal authority or binding force, would either be accepted or 
declined by a resolution of the General Assembly which is composed of all the 
Member States of the United Nations. Such a resolution of the Assembly has 
the significance that it is of the nature of the act of reaffirming or extending the 
scope of the original agreements which all the Member States entered into in the 
abstract erms when joining in the Charter engagement. Inasmuch as the re-
solution is of the advisory nature and hence is not binding any Member States 
opposing to it, it does not by itself assume any judicial function. On the 
contrary, the advisory opinion of the Court on legal question preceding to the 
     48) Art. 34 of the Statute of the Court. See Bowett, op. cit., pp. 125-126. 
     49) Art. 96 of the U.N. Charter.
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resolution presents itself as a phase of its judicial functions. 
  Thus, in the absence of the express provisions in the Charter, what has been 
done by the United Nations in the control of its illegal acts appears to have the 
double functions : on the one hand, the function of clarifying what the law is 
is vested on the International Court of Justice, while, on the other, the actual 
determination based on the findings of the Court is carried out by the General 
Assembly. It thus appears that such a means of controling illegal acts as used 
in this and other occasions by the United Nations is most appropriate and 
therefore applicable to the other international organizations which have no ex-
press provisions concerning the problem which we have considered. 
                      V. Conclusions 
  We have so far been discussing two aspects of illegal acts of international 
organizations: first, the main types of illegal acts in the law and cases of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and, second, the control of such acts in 
the case of the United Nations whose constitution has no provision relevant to 
the points at issue. It seems by no means possible to draw from the observa-
tions of such a limited scope and insufficient inquiry as this something like a 
theory applicable to the problem of illegal acts of international organizations in
general. If, however, it is considered advisable for the further study of the prob-
lem to draw a certain kind of conclusions from what has been observed, itwould 
not be too bold to give tentative conclusions in the following way. 
  Firstly, the possible types of illegal acts would be commonto all international 
organizations. This at once concerns the definition of an international organi-
zation, for, this is due to the fact that, when certain international entities or cor-
porate bodies fall within the category of international organizations, some com-
mon features can be found in their constitutions or legal structures. Thus, a 
certain act which infringes the constitution of an organization would be vitiated 
     50) In January 1959, the first IMCO Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the following question: `Is the Maritime Safety Committee 
of IMCO, which was elected on January 15, 1959, constituted in accordance with the Con-
vention for the establishment of the Organization?' In its advisory opinion of June 8, 1960, 
the Court expressed: `The Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO which was elected on Janu-
ary 15, 1959, isnot constituted in accordance with the Convention f rthe establishment of the 
Organization' (I.C.J. Reports, 1960,p. 150). On April 6,1961, the IMCO Assembly accept-
ed the advisory opinion of the Court and issolved the Maritime Safety Committee l cted on
January 15, 1959 (Lauterpacht, op.cit., p. 102).
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by being an illegal act and therefore would no more be held the act of the organi-
zation even in the case of the absence of explicit provisions to that effect. Suffice 
it to say, in such a case, that there is a strong theoretical presumption i  favor 
of the existence of common types of illegal acts to every international organiza-
tion. However, it goes without saying that, when the constitution of an organiza-
tion provides that certain types of acts could be held illegal, such particular acts 
could differently be laid down depending on the individual character of each 
organization. 
  Secondly, as regards the control of illegal acts, the elements which determine 
the nature of the control appear to depend not upon the nature of international 
organizations in general but rather upon their individual characters, that is to say, 
the scope of their purposes and the extent of the powers entrusted to the organs 
of the organizations. Thus, in an organization with limited purposes and com-
paratively strong powers which could be directed to its members, uch powers 
are required to be exercised strictly within the framework of its constitution i  
order to protect the individual interests of the members. Here the means of 
controling illegal acts are beforehand embodied in the original engagement and 
tends to be more effectively carried out in the form of judicial control. On the 
other hand, in an organization with far-reaching purposes and rather minor 
powers, such powers should scarcely jeopardize the individual interests of its 
members. The control of illegal acts here is sometimes considered even unneces-
sary to be predetermined in its constitution for fear that the effective working of 
the organization should be hindered by an allegation on the part of the individual 
members of illegal acts at the expense of the common interest of the organiza-
tion. Thus, as Bowett rightly observed, certain constitutional issues are not 
thought suitable for independent, judicial settlement.$11 Even when needs arise 
to regulate illegal acts, its control is apt to be influenced by political expediencies. 
  Finally, it is to be noted, however, that even in the absenceof the express 
provisions (concerning illegal acts) in the basic instrument, it cannot be neces-
sarily maintained, as we have seen, that there is no means of recourse available 
to the members or the organs of an organization of reviewing illegal acts. The 
fact is that at the present stage of development of international organizations 
the problem we have dealt with is only about to emerge as a practical concern of 
international life. 
    51) Bowett.                   op.cit.,p.128.
